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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the degree of analysts’ responsiveness to voluntary management guidance.  
Prior studies report that the management guidance is informative and influential (e.g. Baginski et 
al., 1993).  This paper studies various factors that trigger equity market reactions around the 
management forecast issuance date and find that analysts are more reactive to new information 
contained in management guidance when the guidance conveys information that affects the stock 
market. The extent of the analysts’ reaction to management guidance increases when the analysts 
find that the guidance is more credible. Credibility of management guidance from the standpoint 
of analysts means ex-post accuracy of the earnings estimate by the management. The direction 
and the magnitude of earnings forecast revisions are influenced by the assessment of the 
credibility of management earnings forecast by financial analysts. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
anagement guidance is influential. Market participants respond to management guidance. It 
influences investors’ trading decisions reflected in stock price movement around management 
forecast issuance date (Pownall et al., 1993; Skinner, 1994; Anilowski, et al., 2007) and affects 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (Hassell et al., 1988; Baginski and Hassell, 1990; Baginski et al., 1993). Prior studies 
examine stock market reactions to the management forecast, subsequent analysts’ forecast revisions and how both 
investors’ and analysts’ reactions are associated with forecast properties and information environment 
characteristics. Stock market around the management forecast issuance date is affected by the management forecast 
precision (Baginski et al., 1993), history of prior forecast accuracy (Hirst et al., 1999), magnitude of management 
forecast surprise relative to preceding consensus analyst forecast (Waymire, 1984),  and the sign of the management 
forecast (Anilowski et al., 2007). Management issues forecasts to provide guidance to analysts towards targeted 
earnings and to avoid negative earnings surprises (Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Matsumoto, 2002; Brown and Higgins, 
2005). Analysts decide to follow the management guidance understanding that the firm with inside information 
manages earnings to avoid negative earnings surprises at the earnings announcement date (Kaznik and Lev, 1995; 
Cotter et al., 2006). Other studies find that analysts timely update their earnings estimates, 47% within 5 days, and 
revise their earnings forecasts to the meetable or beatable earnings targets (Cotter et al., 2006). 
 
In this paper we examine how influential the management forecast is to affect analysts in updating their 
quarterly earnings estimates. Forecast properties, firm- and industry-specific factors, management’s ability and 
reputation, believability of management guidance, and analysts’ richness of private information comprehensively 
and interactively affect the magnitude of analysts' revision toward the management guidance. When the 
management provides earnings guidance, analysts make two important decisions. The first decision is whether to 
revise their earnings estimates or not. Once analysts decide to make forecast revisions in response to the earnings 
guidance provided by the management, the analysts then decide how fully they adopt management-provided 
information about the future earnings. This paper focuses on the second decision that analysts face by examining 
varying degrees of responsiveness of analysts to information contained in the management forecast. The first 
research question is to study various factors that affect the degree of analysts’ responsiveness to the management 
guidance. Financial analysts do not fully adopt the information contained in the management forecasts. The 
M 
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magnitude of analysts’ revisions that incorporate the earnings prospects of the management guidance differs. How 
seriously analysts listen to management earnings guidance and how closely they follow the guidance is an 
interesting question to pursue empirically. The second research question is whether analysts have abilities to access 
the accuracy and the credibility of the management guidance ex ante, and decide how much of that information to be 
incorporated in their subsequent revisions. Large management forecast errors may result from managers’ 
optimistically biased disclosures or from the lack of private information about a firm’s earnings prospects. This 
examines whether financial analysts know when managers provide biased information and when managers lack the 
abilities in collecting more precise inside information, and whether they have insights to selectively update their 
estimates when management’s earnings guidance contains “healthy” information. Since it is difficult to examine 
managers’ abilities and their efforts in providing “healthy” guidance, we use ex-post accuracy of the management 
forecast as a proxy for the accurate and credible management forecast. Believable or credible management forecast 
means that the forecasted earnings guidance by the firm is close to the subsequently realized actual earnings in this 
paper. Thus, believability or credibility of the guidance is from the analyst’ standpoint that the guidance contains 
less error compared to the actual value. That is, it means it is “accurate” rather than “truthful.” Prior studies report 
that the managers walk analyst towards their reachable earnings targets, and the analysts respond to the management 
guidance by timely updating their forecast (Cotter et al., 2006). The “smart” analysts, who understand the intention 
of the managers that is to guide the analysts towards the meetable or beatable earnings target in order to avoid 
negative earnings surprise at the time of actual earnings announcement, are expected to listen more carefully and 
update their earnings forecasts accordingly. Analysts’ abilities to access the accuracy of the management guidance 
affect the extent to which the analysts revise their forecasts.  
 
In this paper, we find that the direction and the magnitude of analysts’ responses to management guidance 
are aligned with equity market movements. Analysts adopt the information provided by the management more fully 
when they know that the management guidance contains properties that significantly affect the stock market. The 
precision of the management forecast is positively related to analysts’ responsiveness once it is jointly tested with 
the direction of the management guidance. The degree of analysts’ reactions to the management guidance increases 
as the perceived accuracy of the management forecast increases.  
 
This paper studies the extent of analysts’ responsiveness to management guidance and examine whether 
analysts successfully filter credible management guidance and revise their earnings estimates to match the 
information provided by the management. Although extant literature examines analyst reactions to managers’ 
earnings guidance, most studies focus on identifying determinants that influence analysts’ decision to revise their 
earnings forecast. There is little research that comprehensively examines how the various properties of the 
management guidance and perceived credibility of the information by analysts impact the degree to which the 
analysts react to the management earnings guidance. This study extends prior studies on analysts’ reaction to public 
management forecasts by analyzing properties of the management forecast and varying degrees of responsiveness of 
subsequent analyst revisions and by examining whether how much the analysts agree to the management guidance 
foresees the ex-post accuracy of the managers’ earnings estimates.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops hypothesis. 
Section 3 describes the sample selection process. Section 4 provides summary statistics of main variables and 
explains research methodologies. Section 4 provides regression results followed by the conclusion in Section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Management faces conflicting incentives from the market when they issue earnings guidance to market 
participants. The management has incentives to issue favorable forecasts to attract the capital market.  Managers are 
optimistically biased for the concerns of higher stock prices, equity-based compensations, performance evaluations, 
and promotion opportunities tied to stock market performance. On the other side, managers consider their long-term 
reputation. Firm’s managers have specific knowledge about the firm’s operating environment and financial 
condition and possess inside information about future financial prospects of the firm. The managers who want to 
gain reputation provide more accurate and reliable guidance to market participants and minimize earnings surprises 
at the actual earnings announcement. This reputational concern gives the managers an incentive to achieve market 
expectations (Graham et al., 2005). In fact, forecasting is a process that involves multi-periods and multi-agents. 
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Prior earnings forecasts and their dimensions affect subsequent periods’ forecasting directions and respondents’ 
reactions to them (Williams, 1996). Management builds reputation over time by issuing accurate management 
forecasts. Analysts more closely adopt the management guidance issued by management with history of accurate 
prior forecasts (Williams, 1996). The market imposes a stricter penalty when the firm misses consensus analysts 
forecast for the firm that issues the guidance than the firm that does not issue any guidance (Lennox and Park, 
2006).  
 
Similar to firm's managers, analysts have conflicting incentives. Analysts are likely to be optimistically 
biased to maintain good relationship with the firm’s managers. On the other hand, analysts care about their 
reputation in the market and thus, try to provide more accurate forecasts to investors who rely on their earnings 
estimates. Therefore, analysts have incentives to provide accurate estimates to earn credibility from the market and 
to maintain their reputation. Financial analysts respond to the estimates that the management provides. Analysts then 
revise their beliefs about future earnings prospects following the management guidance (Waymire, 1986; Jennings, 
1987; Hassell et al., 1988; Baginski and Hassell, 1990; Williams, 1996; Libby and Tan, 1999; Hansen and Noe, 
1999; Cotter et al., 2006). 
 
Many studies examine stock market reactions around the management forecast issuance dates (Skiner, 
1994; Anilowki et al., 2007). In order to avoid negative earnings surprises that lead to unfavorable stock market 
movements (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002), the firm has incentives to engage in earnings 
expectations to walk the analysts towards their targeted earnings. Cotter et al. (2006) find that more analysts choose 
to revise their forecasts in response to the earnings guidance that leads to achievable targets. By examining analysts 
forecasts one month prior to and one month post to management guidance, Williams (1996) documents that analysts 
respond more to the management forecasts with reputable forecast history. Baginski and Hassell (1990) report that 
the analysts revisions following the management forecast are positively associated with the magnitude of the 
management forecast surprise relative to the initial analysts’ forecasts and the security price reaction around the 
management forecast issuance. Other empirical evidence shows that the equity market asymmetrically reacts to 
downward earnings guidance (Anilowski et al., 2007). That is, the magnitude of negative stock price reaction to 
downward guidance is larger than the magnitude of positive stock price reactions to optimistic management 
forecasts. Kaznik and Lev (1995) report on the negative effect of pessimistic guidance that the stock market reacts 
more negatively to earnings surprises of the firm that issues a downward guidance prior to the actual earnings 
disclosure compared to the earnings surprises of the firm that doesn’t issue any guidance.  
 
The information environment in which the firm operates has impacts on financial reporting quality and on 
disclosure decisions, especially on voluntary disclosures. The firms that face more litigation risks are less likely to 
issue optimistic forecasts in order to avoid legal liabilities (Skinner, 1994). The firms in concentrated industries may 
issue pessimistic forecasts so as to discourage market entry. On the other side, market competitiveness can 
discourage the firms in revealing information that can potentially benefit rival firms. 
 
When the management publicly issues earnings guidance, the first decision that analysts make is whether to 
revise their initial earnings forecasts or not. Secondly, the analysts who decide to revise their beliefs decide how 
closely they will follow the information contained in the management forecast. Earlier studies find that management 
earnings forecasts are predominantly optimistic (Waymire, 1984), but this trend has changed over time. Recently, 
more management forecasts contain bad news (Hutton and Stocken, 2007). Market penalties associated with missing 
earnings target are costly. Managers issue pessimistic forecasts to avoid negative earnings surprises at the time of 
earnings announcement. Managers not only face legal costs but also incur reputational costs if they withhold from 
disclosing bad news and subsequently surprises investors with large negative earnings. Investors take bad-news 
forecasts more seriously because they expect that the managers who have more accurate information about the 
firm’s financial prospects and who want to avoid negative market reaction as a consequence of missing earnings 
target would guide the market respondents towards ex-post more accurate and “honest” earnings target. Thus, when 
the management issues a bad-news forecast, the market sees that as a warning signal that the current consensus 
forecast may be optimistically biased. Understanding that the management faces asymmetric market response at the 
earnings announcement, analysts are expected to respond asymmetrically to the pessimistic guidance vs. optimistic 
guidance. Previous studies report that the precision of the forecast form, magnitude and sign of the management 
guidance and prior forecast accuracy individually or interactively affect the equity market investors. Knowing that 
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equity market investors react to certain properties of the management, the extent of analysts’ responsiveness in 
making forecast revisions may vary. Many studies show that firms engage in expectations management (Cotter et al., 
2006) or earnings management to meet investors’ expectations (Kasznik, 1999; Matsumoto, 2002). For this reason, 
we expect that analysts who care for the reputation in the equity market and who want to maintain good relationship 
with the management are more likely to follow closely the management guidance which contains information that 
captures investors’ attention in the stock market. Based on the arguments above, we conjecture that the magnitude of 
management forecast surprise is positively associated with the analyst’s revision and analysts are more likely to 
react to the pessimistic news in the guidance. However, different properties of management guidance may have 
interacting effects on analysts' forecasts revisions. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H1a:  The magnitude of management forecast surprises and the sign of management forecast news jointly 
influence financial analysts' earnings forecast revisions 
 
The precision of management forecast may affect the degree that market respondents react to the 
management guidance. Management guidance form can influence investor’s reaction to the guidance (Pownall et al., 
1993). In an experimental study, Hirst et al. (1999) find that investor reactions to the management forecast are 
jointly affected by the precision of the forecast and prior forecast accuracy. The management guidance takes the 
form of point, range, open-ended (less than or more than) or qualitative. Management forecast is perceived to be 
more precise in the following order of point, range, open-ended and qualitative. Although the literature supports that 
the stock market reaction is positive to more precise management forecasts (Baginski et al., 1993) and that the 
market returns are abnormally high for management guidance’s with larger surprises, financial analysts’ reactions in 
making revision decisions are mixed. Cotter et al. (2006) report that financial analysts are more likely to make 
revisions to earlier forecasts if the management forecast takes the form of range or “less than” guidance while 
analysts are less reactive to the management guidance that takes the form of point or “greater than” guidance.  Libby 
et al. (2006) show experimentally that the forecast form does not influence forecast revisions by the analysts. Many 
studies find that the investors asymmetrically react more to the management guidance that contains pessimistic news 
by examining abnormal market returns surrounding the management forecast issuance dates. This paper expects that 
the management forecast precision plays a role by separating the nature of the management news. Financial analysts 
are more likely to give weight to the precision of the guidance when the management issues more “confirming 
forecasts” relative to the preceding analyst consensus forecast. We define the management EPS estimate is more 
confirming when the absolute value of the difference between EPS forecasted by the management and initial analyst 
consensus forecast is small (within 3%). Based on evidence in the literature, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H1b:  The precision of management forecasts has more influence on analyst forecast revisions when the 
management guidance is more confirming to the initial analyst consensus forecast and when the 
management issues pessimistic guidance. 
 
Investors respond more strongly when the management forecast is more believable (Jennings, 1987; 
Hansen and Noe, 1999). Jennings (1987) finds that analyst forecast revision is influenced by the believability of the 
management forecast. Financial analysts would fully adopt the management guidance if the management guidance 
contains new information and if the analysts perceive the information as credible. In reality, the analysts’ 
responsiveness to the management guidance varies. The degree to which the analysts revise their EPS forecasts in 
response to the management forecast increases as the perceived credibility of the information conveyed by the 
management guidance increases. If analysts can successfully differentiate the management guidance that is ex-post 
more accurate, then the financial analysts would update their earnings forecasts more closely when their ex-ante 
perceived accuracy and credibility of the information contained in the management guidance is high. With this 
argument, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H2:  Analysts’ responsiveness to the management guidance is positively associated with the ex-post accuracy of 
the management guidance. 
 
The more analysts find the management information credible, the managers will update their beliefs in line 
with the guided information by the management. How much of the management-provided information is reflected in 
the revised analyst forecasts is examined in conjunction with the perceived credibility of the management guidance.  
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Other information properties may affect the level of analysts’ responsiveness to the management forecast. 
More public information is available when the size of a firm is bigger. For example, bigger firms have more media 
coverage. Number of analysts following can be a proxy for analysts’ accessibility to the private information. The 
more analysts follow the firm, the richer the private information is. Where there is more private information 
available about the firm, the analysts are less likely to listen carefully to the management guidance because they 
have less need to search for the information.  
 
3. DATA 
 
We obtain information of quarterly management earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from First Call 
Company-Issued Guidelines (CIG) database. Quarterly management forecasts made prior to 1995 are deleted, due to 
limited coverage in the First Call database. We delete duplicate forecasts and the forecasts with inconsistent dates in 
the database. Over the sample period between 1995 and 2009, we only include the management forecasts that are in 
point or range form. Qualitative and open-ended management forecasts are excluded because of the difficulty in 
quantifying EPS estimates. For the range forecasts, we use the midpoint of the range as an EPS estimate. In our 
sample, firms must issue public forecast in the sample quarter and the analyst should provide earnings estimates for 
the current quarter both before and after the issuance of the management forecast. Our sample requires the firms 
have financial information in Compustat database to obtain the value of the firm, market-to-book ratio, return-on-
asset ratio and Herfindahl and Hirschman index (HHI). 
 
Table 1:  Sample Distribution 
Panel A: Management Forecast Form 
Year Total Point Range Cumulative 
1995 335 148 187 2.64 
1996 457 216 241 6.23 
1997 580 299 281 10.8 
1998 896 436 460 17.85 
1999 848 340 508 24.53 
2000 1,057 407 650 32.85 
2001 1,620 519 1,101 45.6 
2002 1,387 424 963 56.52 
2003 1,091 284 807 65.11 
2004 1,130 298 832 74.01 
2005 955 232 723 81.52 
2006 943 184 759 88.95 
2007 670 134 536 94.22 
2008 681 125 556 99.58 
2009 53 5 48 100.00 
Total 12,703 4,051 8,653 
 
Panel B: Optimistic and Pessimistic Management Forecast  
Year Total Goodnews Badnews Cumulative 
1995 335 181 154 2.64 
1996 457 229 228 6.23 
1997 580 278 302 10.8 
1998 896 370 526 17.85 
1999 848 345 503 24.53 
2000 1,057 477 580 32.85 
2001 1,620 714 906 45.6 
2002 1,387 741 646 56.52 
2003 1,091 585 506 65.11 
2004 1,130 619 511 74.01 
2005 955 479 476 81.52 
2006 943 449 494 88.95 
2007 670 242 428 94.22 
2008 681 266 415 99.58 
2009 53 17 36 100.00 
Total 12,703 5,992 6,711 
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Table 2:  Correlation Matrix 
 
RATIO (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 (1) SURPRISE_MF 0.0392* 
         
 
(0.000) 
         
(2) BADNEWS 0.3594* 0.1005* 
        
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
        
(3) POINT -0.0950* -0.0498* -0.1571* 
       
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
(4) ANALYSTS -0.1781* -0.1605* -0.1779* 0.0443* 
      
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
(5) HORIZON -0.0597* -0.0285* -0.0041 -0.0980* 0.1089* 
     
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.647) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
(6) DISPERSION 0.1265* 0.5771* 0.0945* -0.0333* -0.0944* -0.0396* 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
(7) CHANGEDISPERSION -0.0340* 0.0990* 0.0164 0.0007 -0.008 0.0286* -0.1381* 
   
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.109) (0.946) (0.439) (0.005) (0.000) 
   
(8) MF_ERROR -0.0866* 0.3725* -0.0580* 0.0094 -0.0338* 0.0411* 0.1110* 0.1185* 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.288) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
(9) MEET_BEAT 0.2219* -0.0979* 0.2782* -0.0096 -0.0643* -0.0723* 0.0321* -0.0332* -0.1591* 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.282) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
(10) MEET_BEAT_PY -0.0115 -0.1231* -0.1766* 0.0603* 0.1104* -0.0322* -0.0672* -0.0545* -0.0750* 0.2647* 
 
(0.240) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
This table presents Pearson correlations among management forecast property variables. * indicates significance at the 10% level. Detailed variables definitions are in Appendix A. 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2012 Volume 28, Number 6 
© 2012 The Clute Institute http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  1113 
We obtain analysts’ quarterly earnings per share forecasts for one quarter ahead from Institutional 
Brokerage Estimate Systems (IBES) database. We use actual EPS in IBES to calculate the forecast accuracy of both 
the analyst forecasts and the management forecast. We exclude observations if forecasted EPS by the management is 
equal to the analyst consensus forecast prior to the earnings guidance since we are interested in investigating the 
analysts’ responsiveness relative to the management forecast.  
 
Our final sample involves 3,356 firms, consisting of 12,703 firm-quarter observations of which 11,511 
firm-quarters have both pre- and post-guidance analyst following. Table 1 summarizes the sample distributions by 
the forecast form, direction of the management forecast news and magnitude of management forecast surprise 
compared to the initial consensus forecast. In our sample, about 68% of the management forecasts are range 
forecasts. 53% of the forecasts are pessimistic. The trend has changed over time. Earlier management guidance is 
dominantly optimistic. Recently, firms issue more downward guidance than upward guidance. Table 2 shows 
correlations among key variables.  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Time sequence of quarterly earnings disclosures 
 
We examine how much financial analysts revise their beliefs and what factors influence the magnitude and 
direction of their revisions. Our sample requires quarterly observations with the management forecasts that are both 
preceded by and followed by analysts’ earnings per share forecasts for the given quarter. The time sequence is 
shown in figure 1. We use all of the analyst forecasts before the issuance of the management guidance to calculate 
dispersion and consensus of forecast. For the analyst forecast revision, we separately test only those revisions made 
within 10 days following the issuance of the management forecast. Cotter et al. (2006) report that financial analysts 
quickly revise their earnings forecasts after the issuance of the management forecast. Of those who revise their prior 
forecasts, Cotter et al. (2006) find that approximately 47% of the analysts update their forecasts within five days of 
the release of the management guidance. In this paper, we include more revisions by including forecast revisions 
made within ten days following the management guidance.  
 
Figure 1:  Time sequence of quarterly earnings forecasts 
 
4.2 Control variables 
 
In our regression models, we include control variables to take into account of firm-specific and industry-
specific factors. SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s common equity at the end of previous 
Earnings  
announcement 
for quarter q-1 
Management 
Forecast 
for quarter q 
Earnings  
announcement 
 for quarter q 
Latest 
analyst 
forecast 
for quarter q 
Analyst forecast  
revision within 10 days 
Pre-guidance analysts’ 
forecasts for quarter q 
Post-guidance analysts’ 
forecasts for quarter q 
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quarter. To measure the size of the firm, we also consider the natural logarithm of the total assets. On average, richer 
private and public information is available for larger firms and it is more costly to the firm when the forecast is 
biased. ANALYSTS is the natural log of the average number of analysts with earnings forecasts on IBES for the 
firm. The size of the firms is a proxy for the amount of public information whereas the number of analysts is a proxy 
for the amount of private information. HORIZON is the natural log of the number of days between the management 
forecast date and the actual earnings announcement date. MB is market-to-book ratio at the end of prior quarter. 
Market-to-book ratio controls for the firm’s growth prospects. The industry in which the firm operates can affect the 
firm’s disclosure policies. The firms that face more litigation risks are less likely to issue optimistic forecasts, 
because the management is afraid of potential legal issues when the guidance is turned out to be misleading. 
LITIGATION is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm belongs to a litigious industry and zero otherwise. The 
firms tend to issue pessimistic guidance to mitigate litigation liability (Skinner, 1994). REGULATION is a dummy 
variable equals to 1 if the firm belongs to a regulated industry. Market competition has impact on the firm’s 
disclosure policy. The firms may be reluctant to reveal certain information since the rivals can get benefits from the 
disclosed information. The firms in concentrated industries tend to issue pessimistic forecasts to discourage 
competition. We use Herfindahl and Hirschman index (HHI) to proxy for market competition. The HHI is computed 
as the following: 
 



jN
i
ijtSHHIjt
1
2 ,  
 
where Sijt  is the market share of firm i in industry j at time t. Market share is computed using sales of the firm in 
Compustat. For industry classification, we use 4-digit SIC code in Compustat. High value of the HHI indicates high 
industry concentration or less market competition. The HHI is close to zero as the industry consists of huge number 
of small firms in relatively equal sizes. The HHI increases as the number of firms in industry decreases and the firms 
size is dispersed. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Correlation table is presented in Table 2. We 
dropped SIZE since this variable is highly correlated with ANALYSTS. 
 
4.3 Descriptive evidence 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the variables. Panel A of Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of 
total observations. Summary shows that there are more bad news forecasts than good news forecasts. Panel B 
separates sample into confirming vs. non-confirming management forecast groups. Consistent with Clement et al. 
(2003), analysts make small revisions to confirming management forecast. Also, confirming management forecast 
containing more positive news compared to non-confirming forecasts. Panel C separates the sample into 
observations that are revised and that are not revised. For the revised group, there are more pessimistic forecasts. 
The analysts are more likely to revise their forecasts for larger firms and the firms with more analysts following. 
Panel D compares pessimistic vs. optimistic management forecasts. Pessimistic management forecasts are more 
meetable or beatable although final analyst forecast is less likely to be meetable or beatable. Also, the management 
forecast errors for the pessimistic management forecasts are smaller than those of the optimistic management 
forecasts. 
 
4.4 When financial analysts more carefully listen to the management guidance? 
 
To study when analysts follow the management earnings guidance more closely and when they resist 
following management provided information, we estimate a multiple regression of the fiscal-quarters with the 
management guidance and the analysts’ forecasts of the pre- and post-management guidance. The basic regression 
that examines the varying degrees of analysts’ reactions to the management guidance is as follows: 
 
RATIO = α0 + α1SURPRISE_MF + α2BADNEWS + α3POINT  
+ α4CHANGEDISPERSION + α5MF_ERROR_PY + α6MEET_BEAT_PY 
+ α7HORIZON + α8ANALYSTS + α9MB + α10HHI + α11ROA + α12LITIGATION 
+ α13REGULATION+ ε, (1a) 
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Table 3 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for All Observations 
 
 
All Observations 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 
SURPRISE_MF 12,703 0.0070 0.0160 0.0008 0.0032 0.0077 
SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS 12,703 0.0045 0.0146 0 0.0003 0.0040 
SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS 12,703 0.0025 0.0080 0 0 0.0021 
CHANGEDISPERSION 9,399 0.0022 0.0905 -0.0016 -0.0001 0.0011 
REVISION 11,511 -0.051 0.1525 -0.08 -0.015 0.005 
BADNEWS 12,703 0.5283 0.4992 0 1 1 
GOODNEWS 12,703 0.4717 0.4992 0 0 1 
MF_ERROR 12,703 0.0039 0.0186 0.0003 0.0010 0.0036 
ANALYSTS 12,703 2.0605 0.7862 1.4881 2.0767 2.6418 
SIZE 12,703 6.9811 1.7381 5.7834 6.8122 8.0668 
MB 12,571 0.9504 0.7413 0.4645 0.8945 1.3567 
ROA 11,696 0.0336 0.0408 0.0169 0.0336 0.0515 
HHI 12,696 8.4052 1.8239 7.2697 8.2651 9.3251 
LITIGATION 12,703 0.2652 0.4415 0 0 1 
REGULATION 12,703 0.0324 0.1769 0 0 0 
HORIZON (days) 12,703 34.5211 25.7475 15 29 46 
HORIZON (log value) 12,591 3.2855 0.7838 2.7726 3.3673 3.8501 
POINT 12,703 0.3189 0.4661 0 0 1 
RANGE 12,703 0.6811 0.4661 0 1 1 
MEET_BEAT_MF 12,703 0.6694 0.4705 0 1 1 
MEET_BEEAT_AF 12,703 0.8081 0.3938 1 1 1 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
 
where RATIO captures how responsive the analysts are to the information contained in the management guidance. 
RATIO is equal to REVISION divided by SURPRISE. We use decile rankings of RATIO due to high positive 
skewness of this variable. REVISION is the difference of the consensus analyst forecast before and after the 
management guidance, and SURPRISE is the management estimate of EPS less the analyst consensus forecast prior 
to the issuance of the management guidance. RATIO is one if all the analysts choose to fully adapt the earnings 
estimate of the management guidance. The negative value of RATIO indicates that analysts revised earnings 
forecast in the opposite direction to the management forecast guidance. That is, the analysts disagree with the 
management in making earnings forecast for the quarter. SURPRISE_MF is the absolute value of difference 
between the analysts’ consensus and the estimate by the management. This variable measures the magnitude of the 
surprise by the management in comparison to the analysts’ consensus forecast. CHANGEDISPERSION measures 
the changes in dispersion of earnings forecasts before and after the management guidance divided by the absolute 
value of prior dispersion. Negative value of CHANGEDISPERSION means that the analysts forecast is less diverse 
as a result of the management forecast. BADNEWS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the management forecast is 
pessimistic when it is compared to the preceding consensus analyst forecast. HORIZON is the natural log of the 
number of the days between the date of the management forecast and the actual earnings announcement date. 
POINT is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the management forecast provides exact estimate of the EPS forecast 
and 0 when the guidance is in range format. ANALYSTS is the natural log of the average number of analysts that 
follow a particular firm. MF_ERROR_PY is the management forecast error of prior years. Management forecast 
error is calculated by subtracting forecasted EPS by the management from the realized EPS at the actual earnings 
announcement date, deflated by the closing stock price at the end of prior quarter. MEET_BEAT_PY is the natural 
log of the number of management forecasts that meet or beat the subsequently realized actual earnings in the 
previous year.  
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Panel B: Analysts' Revision to Management Forecasts 
 
Revise 
 
Don't Revise 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 
SURPRISE_MF 11,511 0.007 0.014 0.001 0.003 0.008 
 
1,192 0.011 0.031 0.000 0.002 0.009 
SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS 11,511 0.004 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.004 
 
1,192 0.007 0.028 0 0 0.002 
SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS 11,511 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 
1,192 0.004 0.015 0 0 0.003 
CHANGEDISPERSION 9,399 0.002 0.090 -0.002 0.000 0.001 
       REVISION 11,511 -0.051 0.153 -0.080 -0.015 0.005 
       BADNEWS 11,511 0.543 0.498 0 1 1 
 
1,192 0.383 0.486 0 0 1 
GOODNEWS 11,511 0.457 0.498 0 0 1 
 
1,192 0.617 0.486 0 1 1 
MF_ERROR 11,511 0.004 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.003 
 
1,192 0.007 0.040 0 0.001 0.005 
ANALYSTS 11,511 2.132 0.757 1.591 2.147 2.691 
 
1,192 1.372 0.728 0.811 1.308 1.846 
SIZE 11,511 7.117 1.701 5.932 6.936 8.182 
 
1,192 5.666 1.529 4.577 5.538 6.654 
MB 11,400 0.962 0.735 0.482 0.906 1.363 
 
1,171 0.833 0.793 0.299 0.778 1.312 
ROA 10,636 0.034 0.039 0.017 0.034 0.052 
 
1,060 0.026 0.056 0.011 0.033 0.051 
HHI 11,507 8.303 1.787 7.194 8.189 9.203 
 
1,189 9.395 1.886 8.147 9.028 10.481 
LITIGATION 11,511 0.263 0.440 0 0 1 
 
1,192 0.290 0.454 0 0 1 
REGULATION 11,511 0.032 0.177 0 0 0 
 
1,192 0.031 0.173 0 0 0 
HORIZON (days) 11,511 35.879 25.785 17 30 48 
 
1,192 21.409 21.334 7 15 29 
HORIZON (log value) 11,460 3.348 0.718 2.833 3.401 3.871 
 
1,131 2.652 1.081 2.079 2.773 3.401 
POINT 11,511 0.298 0.457 0 0 1 
 
1,192 0.522 0.500 0 1 1 
RANGE 11,511 0.702 0.457 0 1 1 
 
1,192 0.478 0.500 0 0 1 
MEET_BEAT_MF 11,511 0.669 0.471 0 1 1 
 
1,192 0.674 0.469 0 1 1 
MEET_BEEAT_AF 11,511 0.822 0.383 1 1 1 
 
1,192 0.674 0.469 0 1 1 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Panel C: Pessimistic vs. Optimistic Forecasts 
 
Bad News 
 
Good News 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 
 
N mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 
SURPRISE_MF 6,711 0.009 0.019 0.001 0.004 0.009 
 
5,992 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.003 0.007 
SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS 6,711 0.009 0.019 0.001 0.004 0.009 
 
5,992 0 0 0 0 0 
SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS 6,711 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
 
5,992 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.003 0.007 
CHANGEDISPERSION 5,164 0.004 0.117 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
 
4,235 0.000 0.040 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
REVISION 6,254 -0.109 0.175 -0.140 -0.070 -0.020 
 
5,257 0.018 0.075 0.000 0.005 0.030 
BADNEWS 6,711 1.000 0.000 1 1 1 
 
5,992 0 0 0 0 0 
GOODNEWS 6,711 0.000 0.000 0 0 0 
 
5,992 1 0 1 1 1 
MF_ERROR 6,711 0.003 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 
5,992 0.005 0.017 0.000 0.002 0.006 
ANALYSTS 6,711 1.928 0.769 1.363 1.923 2.474 
 
5,992 2.209 0.779 1.656 2.228 2.784 
SIZE 6,711 6.764 1.699 5.578 6.606 7.779 
 
5,992 7.224 1.750 6.025 7.048 8.345 
MB 6,654 0.883 0.732 0.404 0.826 1.285 
 
5,917 1.026 0.744 0.537 0.972 1.430 
ROA 6,171 0.023 0.040 0.008 0.027 0.042 
 
5,525 0.045 0.038 0.027 0.042 0.061 
HHI 6,709 8.447 1.776 7.333 8.306 9.325 
 
5,987 8.358 1.875 7.161 8.237 9.326 
LITIGATION 6,711 0.290 0.454 0 0 1 
 
5,992 0.237 0.425 0 0 0 
REGULATION 6,711 0.033 0.179 0 0 0 
 
5,992 0.032 0.175 0 0 0 
HORIZON (days) 7,182 33.711 23.482 16 28 44 
 
5,992 35.939 28.199 15 29 49 
HORIZON (log value) 6,671 3.283 0.708 2.773 3.332 3.761 
 
5,920 3.289 0.861 2.708 3.401 3.892 
POINT 6,711 0.250 0.433 0 0 0 
 
5,992 0.396 0.489 0 0 1 
RANGE 6,711 0.750 0.433 1 1 1 
 
5,992 0.604 0.489 0 1 1 
MEET_BEAT_MF 6,711 0.793 0.405 1 1 1 
 
5,992 0.531 0.499 0 1 1 
MEET_BEEAT_AF 6,711 0.742 0.437 0 1 1 
 
5,992 0.882 0.323 1 1 1 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.  
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To test interaction effects of management forecast properties, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
RATIO = α0 + α1SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS + α2SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS 
 +α3POINT_BADNEWS + α4POINT_GOODNEWS + α5RANGE_BADNEWS 
 + α6CHANGEDISPERSION + α7MF_ERROR_PY+ α8MEET_BEAT_PY 
 + α9HORIZON  + α10ANALYSTS +α11MB + α12HHI + α13ROA 
+ α14LITIGATION + α15REGULATION+ ε (1b) 
 
We interact management forecast surprise with the nature of news: good news and bad news. In equation 
(1b), SURPPISE_MF_GOODNEWS (SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS) is an interaction term that is the absolute value 
of the management forecast surprise relative to the initial consensus financial forecast times the dummy variable, 
GOODNEWS (BADNEWS). Management forecast form (POINT vs. RANGE) and nature of the news 
(GOODNEWS vs. BADNEWS) are stacked into four groups. In the above equation (1b), POINT_BADNEWS is 1 
if management forecast provides a point estimate and contains bad news, and 0 otherwise. POINT_GOODNEWS 
is1 if management guidance provides an exact forecast and  have bad news, and 0 otherwise. RANGE_BADNEWS 
is 1 if management guidance provides a range and contains bad news and 0 otherwise. For post-guidance revisions, 
We separate the observations into two groups; all analyst forecasts following the management guidance and only 
those issued within 10 days following the management guidance. We find no statistically meaningful differences 
between these two groups of the sample. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results of analysts’ responsiveness level to the management 
forecast and its relationship with information properties. Analysts follow the management forecast more closely 
when the magnitude of management forecast surprise is large and when the guidance contains pessimistic news. In 
model 3 and 4, the coefficient of POINT is negative and significant. The result seems to be contradicting to the 
expectation that analysts are more responsive to precise forecasts. However, the coefficients in model 1 and 2 in 
Panel B of Table 4 show that precision of management guidance positively influences the ratio of analysts’ 
responsiveness to management guidance when it is jointly viewed with BADNEWS indicator variable. This suggests 
that the direction of the management forecast news is a more dominant factor in influencing the analysts’ 
responsiveness to the management forecast. The coefficient of POINT_BADNEWS is positive and significant, but 
the coefficient of POINT_GOODNEWS is negative. This seems to suggest that the precision of the management 
forecast matters when the management provides bad news to the analysts. Changes in dispersions among analysts 
forecasts seem insignificant in influencing analysts forecasts revisions. As both Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 
indicate, prior history of forecast accuracy seems to be insignificant while the frequency of the management 
guidance that meets or beats in prior years has positive influence on the analysts’ responsiveness. The farther the 
guidance issuance date is from the actual earnings announcement date, the less the analysts would respond to the 
management forecasts. When the firm is followed by my larger number of analysts, the analysts are less responsive 
to management guidance. This confirms the prior findings that the number of analyst following is a proxy for rich 
private information. When the analysts have access to rich private information, they require less information from 
the management. Financial analysts are more skeptical of the management forecast of growth firms. The 
management guidance issued by firms in litigious industry has some effect in influencing the analysts.  
 
4.5 Do the analysts know the credibility of the management guidance, ex ante? 
 
When analysts decide to revise their forecasts by incorporating the information that is contained in 
management guidance, do the analysts do so because they know that the management guidance is accurate and 
credible? The analysts’ responsiveness to the given management forecast varies. That is, some management 
guidance is more influential than others. The natural question is whether analysts respond more actively when the 
information disclosed by the management is more accurate and informative. Do they become more responsive due to 
stock market concerns? Or, do they decide to follow the management guidance to meet or beat the expectations 
knowing that the managers are engaging in earnings management? We define the management forecast to be 
credible when it is close to the realized actual EPS. To test how much the believability of the management forecast 
affects the extent of the analyst forecast revisions, we add independent variables that proxy for the credibility of the 
management forecast in the regression (1b). All other variables remain the same. 
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Table 4 
Panel A: Factors Influencing Magnitude of Analysts’ Responsiveness to Management Forecasts 
 
This table presents factors that influence analysts' forecast revisions in response to management forecast. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The t-values are computed 
using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
 Dependent var. = Ratio 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
     
SURPRISE_MF 3.552***  1.885 4.010** 
 (2.74)  (1.62) (2.35) 
BADNEWS  0.931*** 0.913*** 0.512*** 
  (25.92) (25.18) (10.41) 
POINT   -0.153*** -0.064* 
   (-5.57) (-1.92) 
CHANGEDISPERSION    0.001 
    (1.26) 
MF_ERROR_PY    -4.277 
    (-1.21) 
MEET_BEAT_PY    0.492*** 
    (10.03) 
HORIZON    -0.100*** 
    (-4.03) 
ANALYSTS    -0.150*** 
    (-4.80) 
MB    -0.052* 
    (-1.85) 
HHI    0.006 
    (0.48) 
ROA    -1.387** 
    (-2.37) 
LITIGATION    0.025 
    (0.60) 
REGULATION    0.191 
    (1.51) 
Constant 2.679*** 2.146*** 2.187*** 2.781*** 
 (121.86) (70.53) (63.19) (17.12) 
     
Observations 10,429 10,429 10,429 6,341 
R-squared 0.002 0.129 0.133 0.149 
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Panel B: Factors Influencing Magnitude of Analysts’ Responsiveness to Management Forecasts 
 
This table presents determinants that affect analysts' forecast revisions in response to management guidance. Management 
forecast surprise (SURPRISE_MF) is interacted with bad news and good news indicator variables. Management forecast form 
(POINT vs. RANGE) and the direction of the news (GOODNEWS vs. BADNEWS) are stacked into four groups. In this 
regression, three groups are included: POINT_BADNEWS, POINT_GOODNEWS, and RANGE_GOODNEWS. All variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. . The t-
values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
 Dependent var. = Ratio 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) 
   
SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS 5.982*** 9.471*** 
 (3.16) (4.27) 
SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS -13.729*** -7.714* 
 (-3.73) (-1.79) 
POINT_BADNEWS 0.636*** 0.378*** 
 (11.70) (5.72) 
POINT_GOODNEWS -0.188*** -0.101* 
 (-4.06) (-1.86) 
RANGE_BADNEWS 0.759*** 0.412*** 
 (13.94) (6.35) 
CHANGEDISPERSION  0.000 
  (1.01) 
MF_ERROR_PY  -1.064 
  (-0.34) 
MEET_BEAT_PY  0.489*** 
  (9.88) 
HORIZON  -0.098*** 
  (-3.97) 
ANALYSTS  -0.145*** 
  (-4.62) 
MB  -0.058** 
  (-2.02) 
HHI  0.007 
  (0.55) 
ROA  -0.744 
  (-1.24) 
LITIGATION  0.027 
  (0.66) 
REGULATION  0.195 
  (1.54) 
Constant 2.301*** 2.798*** 
 (50.57) (16.70) 
Observations 10,429 6,341 
R-squared 0.140 0.153 
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Table 5 
Management Forecast Accuracy and Analysts' Responsiveness to Management Forecast 
This table reports whether financial analysts successfully segregate more accurate management guidance and make revisions 
accordingly. Both management forecast accuracy and financial analyst forecast accuracy is considered to test whether forecast 
accuracy affects analysts' revision decisions. Management forecast surprise (SURPRISE_MF) is interacted with bad news and 
good news indicator variables. Management forecast form (POINT vs. RANGE) and nature of the news (GOODNEWS vs. 
BADNEWS) are stacked into four groups. In this test, POINT*BADNEWS, POINT*GOODNEWS, and RANGE*GOODNEWS 
are included. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicated significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. . The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. 
 Dependent var. = Ratio 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
    
SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS 8.361*** 11.415*** 9.440*** 
 (9.10) (8.60) (6.11) 
SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS -6.583*** -4.483** -3.170 
 (-3.66) (-2.09) (-1.42) 
POINT_BADNEWS 0.379*** 0.323*** 0.284*** 
 (9.20) (7.00) (5.86) 
POINT_GOODNEWS -0.187*** -0.121*** -0.105** 
 (-4.98) (-2.85) (-2.38) 
RANGE_BADNEWS 0.572*** 0.450*** 0.404*** 
 (17.75) (12.24) (10.50) 
ERROR_RATIO -0.194*** -0.196*** -0.208*** 
 (-21.69) (-18.82) (-19.04) 
ERROR_RATIO*MEET_BEAT_MF  0.126*** 0.133*** 
  (4.57) (4.62) 
ERROR_RATIO*BADNEWS  0.015** 0.024*** 
  (2.18) (2.60) 
MEET_BEAT_PY  0.035 0.065* 
  (0.99) (1.77) 
CHANGEDISPERSION  0.001 0.000 
  (0.36) (0.33) 
HORIZON  -0.056*** -0.038* 
  (-2.99) (-1.94) 
ANALYSTS  -0.157*** -0.136*** 
  (-8.45) (-6.66) 
MB   -0.064*** 
   (-3.13) 
HHI   -0.004 
   (-0.42) 
ROA   -1.732*** 
   (-4.05) 
LITIGATION   0.069** 
   (2.16) 
REGULATION   0.055 
   (0.66) 
Constant 2.982*** 3.458*** 3.522*** 
 (74.12) (38.78) (27.78) 
    
Observations 10,335 8,124 7,486 
R-squared 0.178 0.184 0.188 
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We examine whether management forecast error is related to the responsiveness of the analysts to the 
management forecast in the following regression analysis: 
 
RATIO = α0 + α1SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS + α2SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS 
 + α3POINT_BADNEWS + α4POINT_GOODNEWS + α5RANGE_BADNEWS 
 + α6ERROR_RATIO+ α7ERROR_RATIO*MEET_BEAT_MF + α8ERROR_RATIO*BADNEWS 
+ α9MEET_BEAT_AF + α10HORIZON + α11ANALYSTS + α12MF_ERROR_PY 
+ α13MEET_BEAT_PY + α14LOGMB + α15LOGHHI + α16ROA + α17LITIGATION 
+ α18REGULATION +  ε,                   (2) 
 
where ERROR_RATIO is relative error of the management forecast to the initial analyst consensus forecast. 
ERROR_RATIO is the absolute value of the realized actual EPS minus the forecasted EPS by the management 
divided by the actual EPS minus initial consensus forecast by the financial analysts. We use decile ranking of 
ERROR_RATIO variable due to high positive skewness. ERROR_RATIO measures the inverse of the accuracy of 
management forecast relative to the accuracy of initial analyst forecast. Higher ERROR_RATIO means that the 
management forecast is less credible. This is ex-post measure of management forecast accuracy. MEET_BEAT_MF 
is 1 if the EPS forecast by the management is achievable and 0 otherwise. MEET_BEAT_AF is 1 if the final analyst 
forecast before the actual earnings announcement is achievable and 0 otherwise.  
 
Table 5 presents results of the regression (2). The direction and statistical significance are similar to the 
empirical findings of the regression (1a) and (1b). The coefficient of ERROR_RATIO is negative and significant. 
When the ex-post measure of the management is less accurate, the analysts respond less to the information provided 
by the management. An interaction term of ERROR_RATIO and MEET_BEAT_MF is positively related to 
analysts’ responsiveness. This may be interpreted that analysts react to the management forecast with some bias if 
they believe that the management issues guidance to avoid negative earnings surprises. The coefficient of another 
interaction term, ERROR_RATIO*BADNEWS is positive. This suggests that investors are asymmetrically reactive 
to pessimistic management forecasts. Analysts believe that negative guidance is more credible and follow them 
more closely.  
 
Overall, empirical findings suggest that the analysts update their beliefs in response to the information 
contained in the management forecast when they perceive that the management provides more accurate information. 
This finding may be interpreted as analysts’ ex-ante ability to successfully filter more accurate and reliable 
management forecasts from those guidance that are less reliable. That is, analysts adapt more fully to the 
information provided by the management when the earnings estimate in the guidance contains less bias relative to 
the subsequently realized earnings. 
 
4.6 Is analysts’ degree of responsiveness to the management guidance self-selected? 
 
In this study, we measure the varying degrees of analysts’ responsiveness in response to the management 
guidance. Given that the management issues guidance, analysts first decide whether or not to revise. Therefore, 
selection of the observations with pre- and post-guidance forecasts may be self-selected. To control for selection 
bias, we use Heckman two-step procedure. In the first step, we include the variables that are likely to affect analysts’ 
decision whether or not to revise. Estimated parameters from the probit model are then used to calculate the inverse 
Mills ratio. Inverse Mills ratio is included as an independent variable in the second step. To control for potential 
self-selection bias, we estimate the following two-step Heckman selection model: 
 
First-stage: 
 
REVISE = β0 + β1MF_ERROR_PY +β2MEET_BEAT_PY + β3DISPERSIONpre  
+ β4ANALYSTS + β5MB + β6ROA + β7HHI + β8LITIGATION  
+ β9REGULATION + υ  (3) 
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Table 6 
Magnitude of Analysts’ Responsiveness Controlling for Self-selection Bias 
This table presents results of Heckman 2-stage analysis. In the first stage, factors affecting forecast revise is estimated using a 
probit regression. Inverse Mills ratio is computed from the first stage is included as an additional control variable in the second 
stage OLS regression to control for endogeneity bias. Management forecast surprise (SURPRISE_MF) is interacted with bad 
news and good news indicator variables. Management forecast form (POINT vs. RANGE) and nature of the news (GOODNEWS 
vs. BADNEWS) are stacked into four groups. In this test, POINT_BADNEWS, POINT_GOODNEWS, and 
RANGE_GOODNEWS are included. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
First-stage 
(REVISE) 
 Second-stage 
(RATIO) 
    
SURPRISE_MF 
6.345 
(2.63)*** 
SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS 
6.172 
(4.00)*** 
BADNEWS 
0.546 
(10.40)*** 
SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS 
-29.598 
(8.02)*** 
MF_ERROR_PY 
-4.591 
(1.82)* 
POINT_BADNEWS 
0.661 
(13.69)*** 
MEET_BEAT_PY 
-0.045 
(0.76) 
POINT_GOODNEWS 
-0.172 
(3.83)** 
DISPERSIONpre 
-20.943 
(3.85)*** 
RANGE_BADNEWS 
0.751 
(18.89)*** 
ANALYSTS 
0.721 
(18.01)*** 
CHANGEDISPERSION 
-0.532 
(3.70)*** 
MB 
0.008 
(0.22) 
HORIZON 
-0.133 
(6.68)*** 
LITIGATION 
0.052 
(0.90) 
ANALYSTS 
-0.169 
(8.31)*** 
REGULATION 
0.253 
(1.41) 
MB 
-0.104 
(4.97)*** 
 
 
ROA 
-0.815 
(1.91)* 
 
 
HHI 
-0.002 
(0.21) 
 
 
LITIGATION 
0.071 
(2.22)** 
 
 
REGULATION 
0.127 
(1.50) 
 
 
INV_MILLS 
4.287 
(5.40)*** 
Constant 
-0.058 
(0.59)*** 
Constant 
3.155 
(26.70)*** 
    
Observations 8,727 Observations 7,808 
R-squared 0.13 R-squared 0.15 
  Adj. R-squared 0.15 
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Second-stage: 
 
RATIO =ϒ0 +ϒ1SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS + ϒ2SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS 
+ ϒ3POINT_BADNEWS + ϒ4POINT_GOODNEWS + ϒ5RANGE_BADNEWS  
+ ϒ6HORIZON + ϒ7ANALYSTS + ϒ8MB +ϒ9ROA + ϒ10HHI 
+ϒ11LITIGATION + ϒ12REGULATION + ϒ12INV_MILLS + ν                           (4) 
 
The results of Heckman two-step model are presented in Table 6. The first-stage regression results of 
equation (3) are reported in the first column. Credibility of management guidance is built over time when firms 
issues earnings guidance that was a close approximate of the actual earnings. If the magnitude of the management 
forecast error is large, then the management forecast is perceived less credible. The negative and significant 
coefficient of MF_ERROR_PY indicates that prior forecast error is negatively related to the likelihood of making 
forecast revisions. Analyst dispersion of the initial forecasts is negatively related to the likelihood of making 
revisions. This is consistent with the outcome that Cotter et al. (2006) find.  The second-stage results show that the 
direction and the magnitude of statistical significance are consistent with those identified in the one-stage model.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Disclosures by management and by financial analysts are interdependent. The nature and type of 
management information and the environment in which the information is produced comprehensively influence 
belief revision decisions of analysts. This paper studies what factors of the management guidance are influential in 
providing useful information to the analysts for belief updates about future earnings’ prospects. We examine the 
relative responsiveness of analysts to the management forecast surprises and its relation to various information 
properties. We find that analysts are reactive to the management forecasts when they find that the guidance contains 
certain characteristics that affect the stock market. Prior studies report that the management forecasts that contains 
negative news, large surprises, and precise information cause stock market reactions. Similarly, we find that 
analysts’ relative responsiveness to management guidance is higher when the guidance contains pessimistic 
information and large surprises compared to preceding consensus forecast. When the magnitude of surprise of the 
management is small, the forecast precision plays a role in influencing analysts’ forecasts revisions. Perceived 
believability of the guidance affects how much analysts follow the information contained in the management 
forecasts. Using ex-post forecast errors of the management and analyst consensus forecast, we find that analyst are 
more reactive when the guidance is more accurate. This seems to suggest that the “smart” analysts can successfully 
filter credible management forecasts and decide to follow closely.  
 
Our paper has some limitations. We use forecast errors as a proxy for credibility of the management 
guidance. Managers strategically manage expectations to meet market expectations. Clearly, they have incentives to 
manage earnings to meet the targeted earnings. The term, “believable” or “credible”, means analysts’ perception that 
the guidance will be within achievable reach and thus, analysts see those forecasts as more reliable. 
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APPENDIX A:  Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
SURPRISE Management forecast surprise, defined as management forecasted EPS minus mean (or median) of 
analyst EPS estimates prior to the management forecast, deflated by stock price at q-1 
SURPRISE_MF Absolute value of SURPRISE 
GOODNEWS A dummy variable that equals 1 if SURPRISE is positive, 0 otherwise. 
BADNEWS A dummy variable that equals 1 if SURPRISE is zero or negative, 0 otherwise. 
SURPRISE_MF*BADNEWS It is an interaction term of SURPRISE_MF and BADNEWS. 
SURPRISE_MF*GOODNEWS It is an interaction term of SURPRISE_MF and GOODNEWS. 
POINT A dummy variable that equals 1 if management issues point estimate, 0 otherwise. 
RANGE A dummy variable that equals 1 if management issues range estimate, 0 otherwise. 
POINT_BADNEWS It is 1 if management forecast is POINT and contains BADNEWS. 
POINT_GOODNEWS It is 1 if management forecast is POINT and contains GOODNEWS. 
RANGE_BADNEWS It is 1 if management forecast is RANGE and contains BADNEWS. 
HORIZON HORIZON is the natural log of the number of days between the management earnings forecast and 
the actual earnings announcement date. 
ANALSYSTS A number of financial analysts is the number of analysts forecasts at the current quarter to which 
the management forecast applies. A natural logarithm of this number is used. 
DISPERSIONpre Dispersion at pre-management guidance is the standard deviation of individual analyst EPS 
estimates made before the management forecast issuance. 
DISPERSIONpost Dispersion at post-management guidance is the standard deviation of individual analyst EPS 
estimates made after the management forecast issuance. 
CHANGEDISPERSION Change in dispersion is the obtained by subtracting DISPERSIONpre from DISPERSIONpost, divided 
by the absolute value of consensus forecast before the issuance of management forecast. 
AFpre Consensus forecast of the analysts is measured as a mean or median of individual analyst EPS 
estimates made before the management forecast issuance. 
AFpost Consensus forecast of the analysts is measured as a mean or median of individual analyst EPS 
estimates made after the management forecast issuance. 
REVISION AFpost-AFpre, deflated by the share price at the end of previous quarter, q-1. 
REVISE REVISE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if analysts revise their forecasts following to the 
management forecast issuance. 
ERROR_RATIO ERROR_RATIO is the error of initial analyst consensus forecast before the management forecast 
divided by the error of the management forecast. This ratio measures the analysts’ error relative to 
the management forecast error. ERROR_RATIO=(actual EPS- AFpre)/(actual EPS-Management 
forecasted EPS). The absolute value of this ratio is used in the regression. 
MF_ERROR An absolute value of management forecast error. Management forecast error is actual EPS less 
management-provided forecast scaled by share price at q-1. 
MF_ERROR_PY Prior forecast accuracy is obtained by getting the mean of absolute value of moving forecast errors. 
Management forecast error is calculated by getting the absolute value of the difference between 
actual earnings per share and the management issued earnings per share deflated by the closing 
stock price at the end of prior quarter. 
MEET_BEAT_AF It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the final analyst issues meetable or beatable EPS forecast 
compared to the actual EPS, and 0 otherwise. 
MEET_BEAT_MF It is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 of the management' earnings forecast is less than or equal 
to (pessimistic) subsequently announced actual EPS and 0 otherwise. 
MEET_BEAT_PY The frequency of management that issued meetable or beatable EPS forecast is obtained. A natural 
logarithm of this value is used. 
LITIGATION A dummy variable equals 1 if the firm belongs to an industry of high litigation risk. The industry is 
identified as high-risk industries: SIC codes 2833 (biotechnology), 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 
(computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), and 5200-5961 (retailing). 
REGULATION A dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to regulated industries:  SIC codes 4812-4813 
(Telephones), 4833 (TV), 4841 (cable), 4811-4899 (communications), 4922-4924 (gas), 4931 
(electricity), 4941 (water), or 6021-6023, 6035-6036, 6141, 6311, 6321, 6331 (financial firms), and 
0 otherwise. 
HHI Herfindahl and Hirschman index (HHI) measures industry concentration of the firm. High HHI 
indicates concentrated market and low HHI indicates competitive market. A natural logarithm of 
HHI is used. I use both sales and total asset to calculate the market share. 
SIZE Size of the firm is measured as the natural log of the number of shares outstanding times the share 
price at q-1. 
MB Market-to-book ratio is defined as market value of equity divided by book value of equity at the end 
of previous quarter. LOGMB is natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio. 
ROA Return-on-asset ratio is defined as earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total asset. 
 
